专题9《公司董事、监事、高级管理人员的资格和义务》

以下为《2026商经法鄢梦萱系统精讲》中专题9《公司董事、监事、高级管理人员的资格和义务》的全部逐字原文内容：

专题9《公司董事、监事、高级管理人员的资格和义务》

一、董事、监事、高管的资格和义务

知识点 062 对任职资格的法律限制（消极任职资格）★

在分析某人能否担任公司的董事、监事、高级管理人员时，公司法从其是否具备民事行为能力、有无特定犯罪、是否具备管理能力、是否失信等方面加以限制。

1. 资格限制

口诀记忆：不能成为公司董、监、高的人员：“小孩疯子贪污犯，无能经理加老赖”。

1. 违反任职资格的处理 (1) 公司违反上述规定选举、委派董事、监事或者聘任高级管理人员的，该选举、委派或者聘任无效； (2) 董事、监事、高级管理人员在任职期间出现上述情形的，公司应当解除其职务。

知识点 063 董事、监事、高管的义务★★★

(一) 忠实、勤勉义务

1. 内容 (1) 董事、监事、高级管理人员应当遵守法律、行政法规和公司章程； (2) 董事、监事、高级管理人员对公司负有忠实义务，应当采取措施避免自身利益与公司利益冲突，不得利用职权牟取不正当利益； (3) 董事、监事、高级管理人员对公司负有勤勉义务，执行职务应当为公司的最大利益尽到管理者通常应有的合理注意。

2. 义务主体 (1) 董事、监事、高级管理人员； (2) 不担任公司董事但实际执行公司事务的控股股东、实际控制人。（《公司法》第180条第3款）

3. 董事、监事、高级管理人员的禁止行为（《公司法》第181条） (1) 侵占公司财产、挪用公司资金； (2) 将公司资金以其个人名义或者以其他个人名义开立账户存储； (3) 利用职权贿赂或者收受其他非法收入； (4) 接受他人与公司交易的佣金归为己有； (5) 擅自披露公司秘密； (6) 违反对公司忠实义务的其他行为。

(二) 关联交易

1. 义务主体：董事、监事、高级管理人员以及与其有关联关系的关联人（《公司法》第182条） 具体包括：①董事、监事、高级管理人员；②董事、监事、高级管理人员的近亲属；③董事、监事、高级管理人员或者其近亲属直接或者间接控制的企业；④与董事、监事、高级管理人员有其他关联关系的关联人。

2. 关联交易的报告和决议规则 (1) 上述主体直接或者间接与本公司订立合同或者进行交易，应当就与订立合同或者进行交易有关的事项向董事会或者股东会报告，并按照公司章程的规定经董事会或者股东会决议通过。 (2) 董事会对上述事项决议时，关联董事不得参与表决，其表决权不计入表决权总数；出席董事会会议的无关联关系董事人数不足3人的，应当将该事项提交股东会审议。

3. 实务难点：未经法定的报告或者公司决议程序，直接或者间接与本公司进行关联交易的，合同效力如何 实务中的一般处理是：公司请求确认该交易对其不发生效力的，人民法院应予支持。当事人有权依据《民法典》及相关司法解释的规定请求返还财产或者赔偿损失。

4. 救济措施 (1) 控股股东、实际控制人、董事、监事、高级管理人员从事的关联交易造成公司损失，公司请求其赔偿损失的，人民法院依法应予支持。被告仅以关联交易已经履行了报告、经股东会或者董事会同意等法律、行政法规或者公司章程规定的程序为由提出抗辩的，人民法院不予支持。 (2) 关联交易存在无效、效力待定、可撤销或者对公司不发生效力等事由，公司没有提起诉讼，符合条件的股东依法提起股东代表诉讼的，人民法院应予支持。

(三) 谋取属于公司的商业机会

1. 原则 董事、监事、高级管理人员，不得利用职务便利为自己或者他人谋取属于公司的商业机会。（《公司法》第183条）

2. 例外 具有下列情形之一的，不认定为谋取属于公司的商业机会： (1) 向董事会或者股东会报告，并按照公司章程的规定经董事会或者股东会决议通过；（董事会对上述事项决议时，关联董事不得参与表决，其表决权不计入表决权总数；出席董事会会议的无关联关系董事人数不足3人的，应当将该事项提交股东会审议） (2) 根据法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，公司不能利用该商业机会。

(四) 同业竞争行为

1. 原则 董事、监事、高级管理人员，不得自营或者为他人经营与其任职公司同类的业务。（《公司法》第184条）

2. 例外 (1) 向董事会或者股东会报告，并按照公司章程的规定经董事会或者股东会决议通过。 (2) 董事会对上述事项决议时，关联董事不得参与表决，其表决权不计入表决权总数；出席董事会会议的无关联关系董事人数不足3人的，应当将该事项提交股东会审议。

(五) 违反义务的处理

1. 公司行使归入权（《公司法》第186条） 董事、监事、高级管理人员违反上述规定所得的收入应当归公司所有。

2. 对公司承担赔偿责任（《公司法》第188条） (1) 董事、监事、高级管理人员执行职务违法、违规、违反公司章程的规定，给公司造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。（见下文） (2) 若公司拒绝起诉或者急于起诉，则会引发股东代表诉讼。（见下文）

二、董事、监事、高管的赔偿责任和责任追究

知识点 064 董事、监事、高管需要承担赔偿责任的情形★★★

1. 责任主体：董事 (1) 公司成立后，董事会应当对股东的出资情况进行核查；董事会未及时履行前述义务，给公司造成损失的，负有责任的董事应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第51条） (2) 清算义务人（原则上为董事）未及时履行清算义务，给公司或者债权人造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第232条第3款） (3) 清算组成员怠于履行清算职责，给公司造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任；因故意或者重大过失给债权人造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第238条第2款） 提示：公司可以在董事任职期间为董事因执行公司职务承担的赔偿责任投保责任保险。

2. 责任主体：董事、高管 (1) 董事、高级管理人员违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，损害股东利益的，股东可以向法院提起诉讼。（《公司法》第190条）（此为“股东直接诉讼”〔1〕） (2) 董事、高级管理人员执行职务，给他人造成损害的，公司应当承担赔偿责任；董事、高级管理人员存在故意或者重大过失的，也应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第191条） (3) 公司的控股股东、实际控制人指示董事、高级管理人员从事损害公司或者股东利益的行为的，与该董事、高级管理人员承担连带责任。（《公司法》第192条）

3. 责任主体：董事、监事、高管 (1) 董事、监事、高级管理人员执行职务违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，给公司造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第188条） (2) 关联交易损害公司利益：公司的控股股东、实际控制人、董事、监事、高级管理人员不得利用关联关系损害公司利益。违反前述规定，给公司造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第22条） (3) 抽逃出资：公司成立后，股东不得抽逃出资。股东抽逃出资，给公司造成损失的，负有责任的董事、监事、高级管理人员应当与该股东承担连带赔偿责任。（《公司法》第53条） (4) 违规减资：违反《公司法》规定减少注册资本的股东给公司造成损失的，股东及负有责任的董事、监事、高级管理人员应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第226条） (5) 违规分配利润：公司违反《公司法》规定向股东分配利润，给公司造成损失的，股东及负有责任的董事、监事、高级管理人员应当承担赔偿责任。（《公司法》第211条） (6) 其他。（略）

〔1〕 实务中，股东直接诉讼的常见情形包括：董事、高级管理人员执行职务过程中，违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，直接损害股东的利润分配请求权、新股优先认购权、剩余财产分配请求权及其参与公司经营管理等合法权益，股东请求董事、高级管理人员承担停止侵害、恢复原状、赔偿损失等民事责任的，法院应当依法予以支持。

三、董事、监事、高管损害公司利益的责任追究（股东代表诉讼）

股东代表诉讼，又称派生诉讼、股东代位诉讼，是指当公司的合法权益受到内部人的不法侵害而公司却急于或者拒绝起诉时，股东为了公司的利益以自己的名义向法院提起的诉讼。

知识点 065 股东代表诉讼的原因

诉讼原因可以概括为“内部人（可控制公司或者对公司决策能够产生重大影响的人）损害公司利益”。具体包括：

1. 董事、监事、高级管理人员侵犯公司合法权益，给公司造成损失 (1) 董事、监事、高级管理人员执行职务违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，给公司造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任； (2) 公司没有提起诉讼的，符合条件的股东可以提起股东代表诉讼。 [例] 翔叔是萱草公司的董事长和法定代表人。他擅自将价值10万元的私家车以100万元的价格出售给萱草公司。此案本应当以萱草公司为原告，翔叔（法定代表人）为诉讼代表人，但此案的被告恰恰是翔叔。一般情况下不会“自己告自己”，故当公司的合法权益受到内部人侵害时，公司很难主张赔偿。

2. 他人侵犯公司合法权益，给公司造成损失 (1) 关联交易损害公司利益的，根据《公司法》第22条的规定，公司可以请求控股股东、实际控制人赔偿所造成的损失；公司没有提起诉讼的，符合条件的股东可以提起股东代表诉讼。 (2) 控股股东、实际控制人“指示”董事、高级管理人员从事损害公司或者股东利益的行为的，根据《公司法》第192条的规定，应当承担连带责任；公司没有对控股股东、实际控制人提起诉讼的，符合条件的股东可以对其提起股东代表诉讼。

知识点 066 股东代表诉讼的前置程序★★★

1. 原则：股东应当先向公司有关机关提出请求，而不能直接提起“股东代表诉讼” 股东若要提起股东代表诉讼，应当先向公司有关机关提出请求，请求公司向法院提起诉讼。该“请求”需要遵守下列规则： (1) 董事、高级管理人员有前述情形的，适格股东（有限责任公司的股东、股份有限公司连续180日以上单独或者合计持有公司1%以上股份的股东）可以书面请求监事会向法院提起诉讼； (2) 监事有前述情形的，前述股东可以书面请求董事会向法院提起诉讼； (3) 股东未书面请求监事会或者董事会依法提起诉讼，直接提起股东代表诉讼的，法院不予受理； (4) 公司全资子公司的董事、监事、高级管理人员有前述情形，或者他人侵犯公司全资子公司合法权益造成损失的，适格股东可以依据前述“交叉请求”规则，书面请求全资子公司的监事会、董事会向法院提起诉讼或者以自己的名义直接向法院提起诉讼。

【萱站点睛】“交叉请求”可以概括为：“董事、高管害公司 → 向监事会请求；监事害公司 → 向董事会请求”。

1. 实务难点：可以直接提起股东代表诉讼的例外情形 实务中，一般认为，当情况紧急，或者不存在公司有关机关提起诉讼的可能性时，股东无需履行前述“前置程序”，可以直接提起股东代表诉讼。具体包括： (1) 不立即提起诉讼将会使公司利益受到难以弥补的损害的； (2) 监事会或者董事会拒绝或者无法提起诉讼的； (3) 公司既不设监事会又不设置审计委员会，符合条件的股东依法对董事、高级管理人员提起诉讼的。

2. 实务难点：接受股东请求，公司直接诉讼的规则 【易错】这是董、监、高损害公司利益，公司直接诉讼，而非股东代表诉讼。 (1) 董事、高级管理人员违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程规定执行职务，造成公司或者其全资子公司损失，依法应当由监事会代表公司对董事、高级管理人员提起诉讼的： ①应当列公司为原告，由监事会主席或者不设监事会的监事代表公司进行诉讼； ②公司不设监事的，由行使监事会职权的审计委员会中无利害关系的成员代表公司参加诉讼； ③公司既不设监事也不设行使监事会职权的审计委员会的，由书面请求公司起诉的股东或者其他与被诉董事、高级管理人员无利害关系的其他股东代表公司进行诉讼。 (2) 监事违反法律法规或者公司章程规定执行职务，造成公司或者其全资子公司损失，依法应当由董事会代表公司对监事提起诉讼的：应当列公司为原告，由董事长或者不设董事会的董事代表公司进行诉讼。

知识点 067 股东代表诉讼的诉讼规则★★★

1. 前提 公司相应机关未依照前述规定代表公司提起诉讼。具体是指： (1) 公司相应机关（监事会、不设监事会的监事或者行使监事会职权的审计委员会，董事会或者不设董事会的董事）收到股东书面请求后拒绝提起诉讼； (2) 公司相应机关自收到请求之日起30日内未提起诉讼。

2. 诉讼当事人 (1) 原告为股东。股东有权为公司的利益以自己的名义直接向法院提起诉讼。

[例] 2021年8月，A咖啡公司因为董事、高管等组织虚假交易的不正当竞争行为被市场监督管理总局罚款4000万元，但A咖啡公司对相关责任人未予追究。2022年6月，张某通过购买原大股东的股权成为A咖啡公司的股东。此时，张某有权提起股东代表诉讼。

(2) 被告为侵权人。 (3) 公司或者其全资子公司为第三人。

1. 实务难点：诉讼的费用负担与调解 (1) 股东代表诉讼案件，股东胜诉的，公司或者其全资子公司应当承担股东因参加诉讼支付的律师费等合理费用；〔1〕 (2) 股东依法提起代表诉讼后，当事人达成调解协议且经公司股东会或者董事会决议通过后，法院出具调解书予以确认。

2. 实务难点：股东代表诉讼的反诉 (1) 前提：他人侵犯公司或者全资子公司合法权益，给公司造成损失，股东提起了代表诉讼。 (2) 处理： ①该他人以原告股东恶意起诉侵犯其合法权益为由提起反诉的，法院应予受理； ②该他人以公司在案涉纠纷中应当承担侵权或者违约等责任为由对公司提出反诉的，法院不予受理。

【随堂小测】 大翔为甲有限责任公司（以下简称“甲公司”）的经理，利用职务之便为其弟弟小翔经营的乙公司谋取本属于甲公司的商业机会，致甲公司损失50万元。甲公司小股东飞侠欲通过诉讼维护公司利益。关于飞侠的做法，下列哪些选项是错误的？〔2〕 A. 必须先书面请求甲公司董事会对大翔提起诉讼 B. 必须先书面请求甲公司监事会对大翔提起诉讼 C. 只有在董事会拒绝起诉的情况下，才能请求监事会对大翔提起诉讼 D. 只有在持股达到1%时，才能请求甲公司有关机关对大翔提起诉讼

09 常考角度总结 SUMMARIZE

1. 不能成为公司董事、监事、高管的人员：“小孩疯子贪污犯，无能经理加老赖”。

2. 公司任免董事、监事、高管合法性的判断。

3. 区分董事、监事、高管的禁止行为和受限制行为；掌握受限制行为的类型。

4. 董事、监事、高管的赔偿责任。

5. 实体法角度：股东能否提起股东代表诉讼；程序法角度：股东如何提起股东代表诉讼，尤其要注意其特殊的诉讼规则。

〔1〕 在前述“股东代表诉讼的前置程序”中，我们知道，股东需要先向公司有关机关提出“请求”，在被拒绝等情形下，股东才能提起代表诉讼。说明公司并不希望提起该诉讼。所以，如果股东败诉，股东支出的调查费、评估费、公证费等费用均由股东自行承担。 〔2〕 ACD

专题10《公司的财务与会计、合并与分立、增资与减资、解散与清算》

以下为《2026商经法鄢梦萱系统精讲》中专题10《公司的财务与会计、合并与分立、增资与减资、解散与清算》的全部逐字原文内容：

专题10《公司的财务与会计、合并与分立、增资与减资、解散与清算》

一、公司的收益分配

知识点 068 公司收益分配顺序（公司层面，如何分配利润）★★★

1. 法律规则 《公司法》第210条第4款 公司弥补亏损和提取公积金后所余税后利润，有限责任公司按照股东实缴的出资比例分配利润，全体股东约定不按照出资比例分配利润的除外；股份有限公司按照股东所持有的股份比例分配利润，公司章程另有规定的除外。

依据上述法条可知，公司在分配当年利润时，需按照法定顺序进行。 (1) 公司利润分配的法定顺序

【原理】 公司在法定情形下收购的本公司股份，需在一定时间内转让或者注销。故在公司转让或者注销前，即使持有本公司股份，也不得分配公司利润。

[例] 萱草公司的注册资本为100万元，约定甲、乙、丙各按20%、30%、50%的比例一次性缴纳出资。甲、乙缴足，但丙仅缴纳30万元，则丙的实缴出资比例为37.5%。具体计算为：实缴注册资本总计80万元，丙实际出资30万元，则 30÷80 = 37.5%。若当年萱草公司分红总额为10万元，则丙可获得3.75万元。

【提示】 公司利润分配顺序：补亏 → 缴税 → 提取公积金 → 向股东分配。

(2) 公司违反顺序分配利润的后果 ① 公司违反《公司法》规定在弥补亏损和提取法定公积金之前向股东分配利润的，股东应当将违反规定分配的利润退还公司； ② 给公司造成损失的，股东及负有责任的董事、监事、高级管理人员应当承担赔偿责任。

1. 实务难点：股东如何提起请求分配利润的诉讼 (1) 股东依据载明具体分配方案的股东会决议请求公司分配利润，公司无正当理由拒绝分配利润的，法院应当判决公司按照决议载明的分配方案向股东分配利润。 (2) 股东未提交载明具体分配方案的股东会决议即请求公司分配利润的，法院不予支持。 (3) 公司违反法律规定向部分股东分配利润，其他股东依法发起股东代表诉讼： ① 请求该部分股东将违法所得的利润返还公司并赔偿损失，负有责任的董事、监事、高级管理人员对因不能返还利润造成的损失承担损害赔偿责任的，法院应予支持； ② 请求公司分配利润的，法院不予支持，但是公司符合分配利润条件，且依据公司章程规定或者公司此前利润分配等情况可以确定具体分配方案的除外。 (4) 公司连续5年盈利且符合分配利润的条件，但却作出不向股东分配利润的股东会决议，投反对票的股东请求公司以合理价格收购其股权的，法院应予支持。 (5) 股东请求公司分配利润案件，应当列公司为被告。一审法庭辩论终结前，基于同一分配方案请求分配利润并申请参加诉讼的其他股东为共同原告。

【原理】 公司盈余分配是公司自主决策事项，是公司或股东基于自身的知识与经验作出的商业判断，因此，法院在介入属于公司意思自治范畴的盈余分配事宜时应当谨慎，不得强制判决公司分配利润。

知识点 069 公积金

公积金，又称储备金，是指公司为增强自身财产能力、扩大生产经营和预防意外亏损，依法从公司利润中提取的款项。公积金分为法定公积金、任意公积金、资本公积金。

1. 法定公积金 (1) 公司分配当年税后利润时，应当提取利润的10%列入公司法定公积金； (2) 法定公积金累计额为公司注册资本的50%以上的，可以不再提取； (3) 法定公积金转为增加注册资本时，所留存的该项公积金不得少于转增前公司注册资本的25%。 [例] 萱草公司现有注册资本3000万元，法定公积金1000万元。若可转增为注册资本的上限为X，则计算公式为 (1000-X) ≥ 3000 × 25%，可以得出：X ≤ 250万元。

2. 任意公积金 公司从税后利润中提取法定公积金后，经股东会决议，还可以从税后利润中提取任意公积金。

3. 资本公积金 应当列为公司资本公积金的项目，本质上是企业收到的投资者超出其在企业注册资本或股本中所占份额的投资，以及直接计入所有者权益的利得和损失、留存收益等。

【随堂小测】 萱草公司的注册资本为100万元，张某和罗某是股东，分别持有70%、30%的股权。2022年，萱草公司决定增加注册资本并引入投资方百果公司。张某、罗某、萱草公司、百果公司另签订投资协议，约定百果公司投资2000万元，持有20%的股权。 问：百果公司投资的2000万元中，多少列入萱草公司的注册资本？多少列入资本公积金？ 答：设X列入注册资本，则 X ÷ (100 + X) = 20%，可以得出：X = 25万元。所以，百果公司的2000万元投资款中，25万元列入注册资本，其余的列入资本公积金。

1. 公积金的用途 (1) 公积金用于弥补公司的亏损、扩大公司生产经营或者转为增加公司注册资本。 (2) 公积金弥补公司亏损，应当先使用任意公积金和法定公积金；仍不能弥补的，可以按照规定使用资本公积金。

二、公司合并、分立★

知识点 070 公司合并、分立的种类★

知识点 071 公司合并、分立的程序★★

【易混】 仅在合并程序中，债权人有权要求公司清偿债务或者提供相应的担保。因为在分立程序中，债务由分立后的公司承担连带责任，已经满足了对债权人的强保护。

三、公司增资、减资

知识点 072 公司的增资★★★

【提示】 注意公司增资表决比例（2/3以上表决权）和股东改变实缴出资比例（“一致决”）。

【随堂小测】 萱草有限责任公司共有6位股东。股东会决议，该次增资引入外部投资者A，500万元增资款均由A缴纳。张某同意增资但反对引入A，其他5位股东因为自有资金不足，均同意由A定向增资。 问：张某可采取何种救济措施？张某能否就其他股东放弃的出资额行使优先认缴权？ 答：张某有权按照自己实缴的出资比例，主张在此次增资时享有优先认缴权。也即在有外部投资者A存在时，仍然要保护张某的优先认缴权。但张某无权优先认缴其他股东放弃的部分。

知识点 073 估值调整协议（对赌协议）★★

1. 估值调整协议的概念 估值调整协议，又称对赌协议，是指投资者与公司或者其股东、实际控制人订立的，约定公司在一定期间内达不到约定业绩或者不能实现上市等条件时，由公司或者其股东、实际控制人回购股权、承担金钱补偿义务的协议。

2. 估值调整协议的效力 (1) 有限责任公司、非公开发行股份有限公司 投资者无论是与公司还是与其股东、实际控制人订立的估值调整协议，只要不存在法定无效事由，该协议就有效。 [例1]（和公司对赌）萱草股份有限公司（非公开发行股份公司）决定引入外部投资者张三，向张三签发的出资证明书中写明：“张三出资1000万元，占股5%。萱草公司承诺3年内利润总额达到4000万元；如果到期不能完成，由公司按每年8%的利息返还本金和利息。”这是和目标公司签订的对赌协议，该约定有效。 [例2]（和股东、实际控制人对赌）例1中，如果双方约定的是“若萱草公司到期不能上市，由公司的大股东李某按每年8%的利息返还本金和利息”，则是和股东签订的对赌协议，该约定有效。

(2) 上市公司的特别规定 投资者与上市公司或者其控股股东、实际控制人订立估值调整协议，约定当上市公司在一定期间内达不到约定的市盈率、市净率等股票市值指标条件时，由公司或者其控股股东、实际控制人回购股权、承担金钱补偿义务等，当事人主张该约定无效的，法院应予支持。

1. 估值调整协议的履行 要分情况处理：

知识点 074 公司的减资★★★

1. 公司的减资程序

【易混】

1. 增加注册资本无对债权人保护的要求。

2. 简易减资无需通知债权人，债权人也无权要求公司清偿债务或者提供相应的担保。

3. 违法减资的后果 (1) 违反《公司法》规定减少注册资本的，股东应当退还其收到的资金；减免股东出资的，应当恢复原状。 (2) 给公司造成损失的，股东及负有责任的董事、监事、高级管理人员应当承担赔偿责任。

4. 实务难点：公司在普通减资程序中未通知债权人的处理 [问题1] 公司在减资时未对已知债权人进行减资通知的，股东是否要对公司债权人承担赔偿责任？ 处理：对于公司债权人利益的保护，目前基本达成一致意见，即：公司违反《公司法》规定减少注册资本，权利受到侵害的公司债权人请求股东在其因减资所获利益范围内对公司债务承担责任，或者请求存在故意或者重大过失的董事、高级管理人员承担损害赔偿责任的，法院应予支持。 [问题2] 减资程序中，公司通知瑕疵是否导致减资无效？（或者股东是否有权主张股东会减资决议无效？） 《公司法》回避了瑕疵减资行为的效力争论，仅对瑕疵减资的责任承担作出了规定，而未明确违法法定程序进行的“减资行为”是否有效。 关于瑕疵减资行为是否有效，目前尚有争议，主要存在以下三种观点：

四、公司解散

公司解散，是指已成立的公司基于一定合法事由而使公司消灭的法律行为。

知识点 075 公司解散的事由

知识点 076 司法判决解散公司★★★

《公司法》第231条 公司经营管理发生严重困难，继续存续会使股东利益受到重大损失，通过其他途径不能解决的，持有公司10%以上表决权的股东，可以请求人民法院解散公司。

1. “公司经营管理发生严重困难”的认定 (1) 公司经营管理发生严重困难，又称“公司僵局”状态。实务中，存在下列情形之一的，可以认定为构成“僵局”： ① 公司持续2年以上无法召开股东会； ② 股东表决时无法达到法定或者公司章程规定的比例，持续2年以上不能作出有效的股东会决议； ③ 公司董事长期冲突，且无法通过股东会解决； ④ 公司经营管理发生严重困难的其他情形。 (2) 股东以下列事由提起解散公司诉讼的，法院不予受理： ① 知情权、利润分配请求权等权益受到损害； ② 公司亏损、财产不足以偿还全部债务； ③ 公司被吊销企业法人营业执照未进行清算等。

【原理】 判断“公司经营管理是否发生严重困难”，应从公司组织机构的运行状态进行综合分析。股东会机制长期失灵，内部管理有严重障碍，已陷入“僵局”状态的，即使公司处于盈利状态，也可以认定为公司经营管理发生严重困难。

1. 司法判决解散的诉讼当事人的认定 (1) 原告：单独或者合计持有公司全部股东表决权10%以上的股东，可提起司法解散之诉。 (2) 被告：解散公司诉讼，应当以公司为被告。 (3) 对未提起诉讼的“其他股东”的处理 ① 股东以其他股东为被告一并提起诉讼的，法院应当告知原告将其他股东变更位第三人；原告坚持不变更的，法院应当驳回原告对其他股东的起诉。 ② 原告提起解散公司诉讼应当告知其他股东，或者由法院通知其参加诉讼。其他股东或者利害关系人申请以共同原告或者第三人身份参加诉讼的，法院应予准许。

2. 司法解散与清算的处理及保全措施 (1) 股东在提起解散公司诉讼的同时又申请法院对公司进行清算的，对其提起的解散公司诉讼，依法审查； (2) 对其清算申请，法院不予受理，但应当告知其在法院判决解散公司后，依据《公司法》的相关规定，由清算义务人自行组织清算或者另行申请法院对公司进行清算； (3) 股东提起解散公司诉讼时，向法院申请财产保全或者证据保全的，在股东提供担保且不影响公司正常经营的情形下，法院可予准许。

3. 解散判决的既判力 (1) 法院关于解散公司诉讼作出的判决，对公司全体股东发生法律效力； (2) 法院判决驳回解散公司诉讼请求后，提起诉讼的股东或者其他股东又以同一事实和理由提起解散公司诉讼的，法院不予受理。

4. 解散诉讼注重调解原则 法院审理解散公司诉讼案件，应当注重调解。 (1) 当事人协商同意由公司收购股权、股东或者他人受让股权以及公司减资等方式使公司存续，且不违反法律、行政法规强制性规定的，法院应予支持。 (2) 当事人不能协商一致使公司存续的，法院应当及时判决。 (3) 经法院调解公司收购原告股权的，公司应当自调解书生效之日起6个月内将股权转让或者注销。股权转让或者注销之前，原告不得以公司收购其股权为由对抗公司债权人。

【经典案例】 林某、戴某为凯莱公司的股东。2016年起，二人之间的矛盾逐渐显现。同年，林某5次委托律师向凯莱公司和戴某发函称，因股东权益受到严重侵害，林某作为享有公司股东会1/2表决权的股东，已按公司章程规定的程序表决通过了解散凯莱公司的决议，要求戴某提供凯莱公司的财务账册等资料，并对凯莱公司进行清算。同年，戴某3次回函称，林某作出的股东会决议没有合法依据，戴某不同意解散公司，并要求林某交出公司的财务资料。从2016年至2019年，凯莱公司持续4年未召开股东会。在纠纷处理过程中，服装城管委会调解委员会2次组织双方进行调解，但均未成功。2020年12月，林某向法院提起诉讼，请求解散凯莱公司，但遭到戴某反对，因为至林某提起诉讼时，凯莱公司及其下属分公司运营状态良好。 问：股东林某提出的解散公司的诉讼请求能否得到法院支持？ 答：能。该公司处于盈利状态，但其股东会机制长期失灵，公司陷入“僵局”状态且无法通过其他方法解决，连续超过2年未能召开股东会，使得股东权益受到重大损害，可以认定为公司经营管理发生严重困难，符合条件的股东可以提起解散公司诉讼。

五、公司清算★

清算，是指公司解散后，清算义务人处理公司未了结的业务、偿还公司所欠税款、清偿公司债务、向股东分配剩余财产。这一系列工作完成后，由清算义务人申请公司注销登记。

【萱站点睛】【易混】此处的“清算” ≠ 破产清算程序，后者要遵守《企业破产法》的规则。

知识点 077 清算义务人、清算组的组成★★

1. 清算义务人 《公司法》第232条第1款规定，董事为公司清算义务人，应当在解散事由出现之日起15日内组成清算组进行清算。

2. 清算组的组成 (1) 清算组由董事组成，但是公司章程另有规定或者股东会决议另选他人的除外； (2) 公司依法应当清算，逾期不成立清算组进行清算或者成立清算组后不清算的，利害关系人可以申请法院指定有关人员组成清算组进行清算。（司法清算）

3. 实务难点：申请司法清算的“利害关系人” 实务中，一般认为，下列利害关系人申请法院指定清算组进行清算的，法院应予受理：①债权人；②股东；③作出吊销营业执照、责令关闭或者撤销决定的部门或者公司登记机关。 但是，董事急于履行清算义务，未依法组成清算组进行自行清算，直接申请法院指定清算组进行清算的，法院不予受理。

4. 实务难点：组成清算组的“有关人员” 实务中，法院受理公司清算案件，并及时组织清算组进行清算。清算组成员可以从下列人员或者机构中产生： (1) 公司董事、股东、监事、高级管理人员； (2) 依法设立的律师事务所、会计师事务所、破产清算事务所等社会中介机构； (3) 依法设立的律师事务所、会计师事务所、破产清算事务所等社会中介机构中具备相关专业知识并取得执业资格的人员。

知识点 078 清算程序★★

1. 清算中公司的诉讼地位 (1) 公司开始清算后完成注销登记前，涉及公司的民事诉讼，应当以公司的名义进行，由清算组负责人代表公司参加诉讼； (2) 清算组尚未成立的，由原法定代表人代表公司参加诉讼。

2. 通知债权人及债权申报 (1) 清算组应当自成立之日起10日内通知债权人，并于60日内公告。 (2) 债权人应当自接到通知之日起30日内，未接到通知的自公告之日起45日内，向清算组申报其债权。 (3) 在申报债权期间，清算组不得对债权人进行清偿。 (4) 债权人在规定的期限内未申报债权，在公司清算程序终结前补充申报的，清算组应当予登记。债权人补充申报的债权，可以在公司尚未分配的财产中依法清偿。

3. 制订清算方案 (1) 清算组应当制订清算方案，并报股东会或者法院确认； (2) 清算期间，公司存续，但不得开展与清算无关的经营活动。

4. 清算财产的确定及剩余财产的分配 (1) 股东尚未缴纳的出资均应作为清算财产，不受诉讼时效、出资期限的限制。 [提示] 此处“股东尚未缴纳的出资”，包括到期应缴未缴的出资以及出资期限尚未届满的认缴出资。 (2) 清算财产按照下列顺序分配： 支付清算费用 → 支付职工的工资、社会保险费用和法定补偿金 → 缴纳所欠税款 → 清偿公司债务 → 股东分配剩余财产 → 申请注销公司登记 (3) 公司财产在未依照前述顺序清偿前，不得分配给股东。

知识点 079 清算中的义务和赔偿责任★★★

1. 清算义务人（董事）的责任 由前文可知，董事为公司清算义务人。 (1) 法律规则：《公司法》第232条第3款规定：“清算义务人未及时履行清算义务，给公司或者债权人造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。”该赔偿责任的性质是违反履行清算义务致使公司无法清算所应当承担的侵权责任。 (2) 实务难点：如何认定“未及时履行清算义务” 一般认为，“未及时履行清算义务”包括下列情形： ① 董事恶意处置公司财产，或者未在法定期限内成立清算组开始清算导致公司财产贬值、毁损、灭失，债权人主张其在造成损失范围内对公司债务承担损害赔偿责任的，人民法院应予支持； ② 董事怠于履行清算义务，导致公司因主要财产、账册、重要文件等灭失而无法进行清算，债权人主张其对公司债务承担损害赔偿责任的，人民法院应予支持，但是董事举证证明公司在出现解散事由之前已无财产可供清算的除外。

2. 清算组成员的责任 由前文可知，清算组由董事组成，但允许公司章程另有规定或者股东会决议另选他人；同时，利害关系人可以申请人民法院指定有关人员组成清算组进行清算。 (1) 法律规则：《公司法》第238条规定：“清算组成员履行清算职责，负有忠实义务和勤勉义务。清算组成员怠于履行清算职责，给公司造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任；因故意或者重大过失给债权人造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。” (2) 实务难点：如何认定“故意或者重大过失” 一般认为，“故意或者重大过失”包括下列情形： ① 清算组未履行通知或者公告义务，导致债权人因未及时申报债权而未获清偿，债权人请求清算组成员对因此造成的损失承担赔偿责任的，人民法院应当依法予以支持； ② 清算组成员恶意处置公司财产，或者未经依法清算程序即以虚假的清算报告骗取公司登记机关办理公司注销登记，债权人请求其承担损害赔偿责任的，人民法院应予支持。

知识点 080 公司的注销★★

10 常考角度总结 SUMMARIZE

1. 公积金“三个三” (1) 三分类：法定、任意、资本公积金； (2) 三用途：补亏/扩产/增资； (3) 三比例：10%/50%/≥25%（仅指法定公积金）。

2. 公积金提取合法性的认定；资本公积金的用途：一定条件下可以弥补公司亏损。

3. 简易合并程序。

4. 增资中的“优先认缴权”；股东对赌协议和公司对赌协议的区别。

5. 简易减资程序。

6. 违法减资的处理。

7. 清算组成员的忠实、勤勉义务。

8. 拖延清算的处理：强制注销。

9. 法院强制性分配公司利润有效性的认定。

10. 公司“僵局”的认定和处理。可细分为以下两个方面： (1) 实体法角度——股东能否提起司法解散之诉； (2) 程序法角度——司法解散之诉的诉讼规则。

11. 清算人的义务和赔偿责任；判断清算组成员是否对公司及债权人承担赔偿责任。

专题9《公司董事、监事、高级管理人员的资格和义务》

专题9《公司董事、监事、高级管理人员的资格和义务》

考点 28 对任职资格的法律限制

第1题 下列哪些人员不能担任公司的董事？(2022-回忆版-多)

A 甲因炒股欠下巨额债务不清偿，被法院列入失信被执行人名单

B 乙曾因挪用公款受到刑事处罚，执行期刚满4年

C 丙曾主导公司盲目借款，最终导致该公司因巨额负债而在2年前被破产清算

D 丁2年前担任一家长期负债的公司的法定代表人，上任后不久该公司即被责令关闭

第2题 A股份公司是上市公司，董事会成员共5人，股东B公司持股51%，股东C公司持股1%。B公司推荐赵某担任董事，后A公司确定赵某是公司董事长和法定代表人。2023年，A公司通报经营情况，去年亏损6000万元，赵某主动辞去董事职务，B公司遂推荐其市场部经理陈某担任A公司董事，但C公司反对陈某担任，理由是陈某因欠下巨额赌债尚未归还，被法院列为失信被执行人，不适合担任此职务。C公司推荐姜某担任A公司独立董事。以下哪些说法是正确的？(2023-回忆版-多)

A 陈某不能担任A公司董事

B C公司有权推荐姜某担任A公司独立董事

C 赵某的董事资格自递交辞呈至公司时即发生效力

D 赵某提出辞去董事职务，其可保留公司法定代表人职务

考点 29 董事、监事、高管的义务、赔偿责任

第3题 A有限责任公司从事文化创意设计，甲、乙、丙三人组成董事会，丙担任法定代表人。2023年，A公司获得一项外观设计专利。2024年9月，丙将该专利以市场价格转让给B公司。经查明，B公司是由丙的妻子丁通过其胞妹控制的公司，且丙事先未告知甲和乙。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2024-回忆版-单)

A 丙与B公司无关联关系，其转让该专利的行为没有违反忠实义务

B 丙系以市场价格转让该专利，其转让该专利的行为没有违反董事义务

C 丙转让该专利，应报告董事会并经董事会同意

D 丙转让该专利，应报告股东会并经股东会同意

考点 30 股东代表诉讼（原因、前置程序、诉讼规则）

第4题 甲、乙、丙三人出资设立萱草有限公司，甲持有公司10%的股权。该公司未设董事会和监事会。甲发现公司执行董事乙（持有该公司89%的股权）将产品低价出售给乙妻子开办的公司，导致萱草公司营业收入大幅降低，遂书面向公司监事丙（持有该公司1%的股权）反映，丙未予理会。甲可以采取哪些措施保护公司和自己的合法利益？(2018-回忆版-多)

A 提议召开临时股东会，解除乙的执行董事职务

B 请求公司以合理的价格收购自己的股权

C 以公司的名义对乙提起民事诉讼，要求赔偿公司的损失

D 以自己的名义对乙提起民事诉讼，要求赔偿公司的损失

第5题 大合有限公司成立于2021年2月，股东为甲、乙、丙三人，甲担任董事长和法定代表人，公司未设监事。公司章程约定，对外担保需要董事会一致同意。2022年3月，甲自己做主以公司名义为朋友张三提供担保。现因张三无法清偿，大合公司需对该笔债务承担连带保证责任。2022年4月，丙将其股权转让给了丁。随后，针对甲对公司造成的损失，股东乙、丙、丁咨询律师。律师的下列答复哪些是错误的？(2022-回忆版-多)

A 本案股东若直接提起股东代表诉讼，人民法院不予受理

B 股东胜诉的，大合公司才承担股东因参加代表诉讼支出的合理费用

C 在紧急情况下，丙有权提出股东代表诉讼

D 本案丁持股未满180日，无权提起股东代表诉讼

第6题 甲有限责任公司股东为赵某、钱某、孙某。董事长兼法定代表人张某在任职期间，与甲公司实施关联交易严重损害甲公司利益。孙某依法提起股东代表诉讼，要求张某承担赔偿责任。案件审理过程中，孙某与张某达成调解协议。关于该调解协议的生效，下列哪些说法是正确的？(2025-回忆版-多)

A 该调解协议未经甲公司股东会或者董事会决议通过后，方可生效

B 该调解协议须经全体股东一致同意后，方可对甲公司发生效力

C 只要孙某与张某达成一致，调解协议即对甲公司发生效力

D 该调解协议中张某向孙某支付赔偿的条款无效

专题10《公司的财务与会计、合并与分立、增资与减资、解散与清算》

专题10《公司的财务与会计、合并与分立、增资与减资、解散与清算》

考点 31 公司收益分配顺序、公积金

第7题 甲有限责任公司成立于2015年，章程约定：公司成立后前3年不分红，之后如果公司分红，则应在股东会决议作出后3个月内完成分配。2020年甲公司召开股东会，股东张某请求分红被拒。2021年5月10日召开股东会时，因多个股东要求分红，甲公司形成了在12月31日前完成向股东分红的决议。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2021-回忆版-单)

A 2020年张某要求分红被拒绝，其有权请求甲公司以合理的价格收购股权

B 甲公司作出分红决议后，股东可对外转让利润分配请求权

C 甲公司章程约定公司成立后前3年不分红不合法

D 全体股东只能按照2021年股东会决议中约定的时间完成分红

第8题 A公司是一家非上市股份有限公司。2020年年末数据显示，A公司本年度未弥补亏损0.4亿元。2021年，A公司经营好转，年底计算得到的利润为0.8亿元，无累积的法定公积金。关于2021年公司利润款项的处理，下列哪些说法是正确的？(2022-回忆版-多)

A 利润0.8亿元应当先弥补上一年度的亏损

B 董事会有权决定提取一定比例的任意公积金

C A公司可提取0.08亿元列入法定公积金

D 对于溢价发行的股款应当列入资本公积金

第9题 A有限责任公司章程约定，股东甲应于2027年9月1日前缴纳出资300万元。后经全体股东一致同意，决定将公司任意公积金转为甲的出资，不再以现金出资。2025年1月，A公司因资不抵债被人民法院裁定受理破产申请。破产管理人调查发现，甲没有和A公司之间缴纳出资款的凭证。关于甲的出资责任，下列说法正确的是：(2025-回忆版-单)

A 因甲的出资期限尚未届满，无需履行出资义务

B 甲的出资责任没有免除，应当继续履行出资义务

C 管理人可请求法院撤销股东会决议

D 因全体股东同意以公积金转为甲的出资，甲的出资义务已经履行完毕

考点 32 公司合并、分立

第10题 张某、李某为甲公司的股东，分别持股65%与35%，张某为公司董事长。为谋求更大的市场空间，张某提出吸收合并乙公司的发展战略。关于甲公司的合并行为，下列哪些表述是正确的？(2015/3/69-多)

A 只有取得李某的同意，甲公司内部的合并决议才能有效

B 在合并决议作出之日起15日内，甲公司须通知其债权人

C 债权人自接到通知之日起30日内，有权对甲公司的合并行为提出异议

D 合并乙公司后，甲公司须对原乙公司的债权人负责

第11题 盛兴公司是一家有限责任公司，甲、乙、丙为其股东，分别持股20%、35%、45%，公司仅设1名执行董事。盛兴公司与自然人林某共同投资设立B公司，其中盛兴公司持股92%，林某持股8%。现盛兴公司拟吸收合并B公司。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2025-回忆版-单)

A 盛兴公司股东会就合并事项作出决议时，甲、乙同意即可通过，无需丙同意

B 盛兴公司仅设1名董事，该合并事项应直接交由股东会决议

C 盛兴公司对B公司控股92%，因此无需通知林某

D B公司可不经过股东会决议，由盛兴公司决定合并事项

考点 33 公司增资、估值调整协议、减资

第12题 汪某是蓝鸭股份有限公司的大股东及法定代表人。为了公司融资，汪某以个人名义和蓝鸭公司名义分别与爱思基金签订增资协议，约定爱思基金向蓝鸭公司投资2亿元，持有蓝鸭公司4%的股权，并约定该次增资后3年内蓝鸭公司上市，若未完成该目标，汪某以市场价格收购爱思基金持有的公司股权，且蓝鸭公司以自有办公楼为汪某收购股权提供担保。之后蓝鸭公司持续亏损，汪某无资金回购股权，双方发生纠纷。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2022-回忆版-单)

A 汪某和爱思基金签订的股权收购协议，因违反资本维持原则而无效

B 蓝鸭公司为汪某收购股权提供担保，因违反资本维持原则而无效

C 汪某应当承担违约责任，蓝鸭公司应当承担担保责任

D 其他股东可以以该协议损害其优先认缴权为由，主张合同无效

第13题 甲、乙共同出资设立A有限责任公司，注册资本2亿元，甲、乙分别认缴1亿元，约定出资期限为2030年。2022年A公司和兆昆公司签订协议，以5000万元的价格受让兆昆公司的专利使用权。协议签订后，A公司经股东会决议将注册资本减至2000万元，出资期限不变，各股东的认缴出资额相应降低。但此次减资未通知兆昆公司，且该项债权在A公司减资之后不能清偿。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2022-回忆版-多)

A 即使未到出资期限，因减资程序违法导致股东被减少的出资应当恢复原状

B 该次减资未通知债权人构成减资无效

C 兆昆公司可以向甲、乙主张连带赔偿责任

D 兆昆公司可以主张甲、乙在其因减资所获利益范围内对债务承担补充赔偿责任

第14题 甲公司由王某、李某、吴某设立，注册资本为200万元。王某和吴某均已实缴完毕，李某认缴出资50万元但尚未届缴纳期限，公司有20万元资本公积金。现甲公司亏损严重，三位股东同意减少公司注册资本50万元以弥补亏损。对此，下列哪些选项是错误的？(2024-回忆版-多)

A 甲公司此次减少注册资本，无需在报纸上或者国家企业信用信息公示系统公告

B 甲公司可以不动用资本公积金20万元，直接通过减少注册资本来弥补亏损

C 债权人得知甲公司减资，可要求甲公司清偿债务或提供担保

D 李某到期缴出资期限时，应按照减资后的出资比例缴纳出资

第15题 新社有限责任公司的股东为罗某、夏某、李某。公司章程规定：注册资本300万元，李某实缴60万元，罗某、夏某各认缴120万元，应在2028年4月1日前实缴。2025年1月，新社公司召开股东会决议减少注册资本100万元，并且李某取回出资10万元，罗某、夏某各减少45万元出资。罗某、夏某赞成，但李某反对对自己只取回10万元。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2025-回忆版-单)

A 新社公司这次减资构成抽逃出资，故该决议可被撤销

B 因罗某、夏某未实缴出资，故该减资决议无效

C 因全体股东未一致同意按不同比例减资，故该减资行为无效

D 因罗某、夏某同意减资，故该次减资有效

考点 34 公司解散、清算、注销

第16题 李桃是某股份公司发起人之一，持有14%的股份。在公司成立后的2年多时间里，各董事之间矛盾不断，不仅使公司原定上市计划难以实现，更导致公司经营管理出现严重困难。关于李桃可采取的法律措施，下列哪一说法是正确的？(2015/3/27-单)

A 可起诉各董事履行对公司的忠实义务和勤勉义务

B 可同时提起解散公司的诉讼和对公司进行清算的诉讼

C 在提起解散公司诉讼时，可直接要求法院采取财产保全措施

D 在提起解散公司诉讼时，应以公司为被告

第17题 萱草公司有甲、乙、丙三个股东，甲和乙是夫妻，各自持有49%的股份。因甲乙感情不和发生矛盾，一直未召开股东会。但由于公司所在地租金上涨，公司一直处于盈利状态。丙提起解散公司之诉。据此，下列说法正确的是：(2021-回忆版-多)

A 因公司一直处于盈利状态，法院不得判决解散公司

B 甲可以以自己的名义提起解散公司之诉

C 丙无权提起解散公司之诉

D 丙可以以其知情权受到损害为由请求法院解散公司

第18题 A公司有两名股东，甲持股60%，乙持股40%。后因经营不善，甲欲解散公司，召开股东会讨论时，乙不同意，并且乙在决议上特别注明：A公司欠乙2000万元，未设定担保，公司应在偿还完欠款后再讨论解散事宜。后因A公司的其他债权到期无力偿还，外部债权人起诉至法院，A公司被法院受理破产。下列哪些说法是正确的？(2023-回忆版-多)

A 解散公司的股东会决议不成立

B 解散公司的股东会决议成立但乙可主张撤销

C 乙为关联债权人，应在破产程序中列为滞后债权，在普通债权之后清偿

D 乙为关联债权人，在破产程序中列为普通债权，与其他普通债权平等受偿

第19题 甲和乙共同出资设立丽丽有限责任公司，甲担任公司董事，乙担任公司监事。丽丽公司因未清偿到期债务，被A公司起诉至法院。在该诉讼进行中，甲和乙决定解散丽丽公司，并通过简易程序注销公司，但诉讼尚在进行。对此，下列说法正确的是：(2024-回忆版-单)

A 丽丽公司的解散和注销须经股东会决议

B 甲和乙都是清算组成员，须承担清算义务

C 在丽丽公司清算期间，有关公司的诉讼应中断

D 丽丽公司注销后，甲和乙应对公司的债务承担连带责任

【English Version】

Commercial and Economic Law

Topic 9: Qualifications and Duties of Company Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers

The following is the full verbatim text of Topic 9, "Qualifications and Duties of Company Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers", from the 2026 Commercial and Economic Law — Yan Mengxuan Systematic Intensive Lecture:

Topic 9: Qualifications and Duties of Company Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers

I. Qualifications and Duties of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers

Knowledge Point 062: Statutory Restrictions on Eligibility (Negative Eligibility Requirements) ★

In determining whether a person may serve as a director, supervisor or senior manager of a company, the Company Law imposes restrictions based on civil capacity, specific criminal convictions, managerial competence and creditworthiness.

1. Restrictions on Eligibility

Mnemonic: Persons who may not serve as directors, supervisors or senior managers of a company: "Minors, persons of unsound mind, embezzlers, incompetent managers, and dishonest debtors" (小孩疯子贪污犯，无能经理加老赖).

1. Consequences of Breach of Eligibility Requirements (1) Where a company elects or appoints a director or supervisor, or engages a senior manager, in violation of the above provisions, such election, appointment or engagement is void; (2) Where a director, supervisor or senior manager falls within any of the above circumstances during his term of office, the company shall remove him from office.

Knowledge Point 063: Duties of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers ★★★

(I) Duties of Loyalty and Diligence

1. Content (1) Directors, supervisors and senior managers shall comply with laws, administrative regulations and the articles of association of the company; (2) Directors, supervisors and senior managers owe a duty of loyalty to the company, shall take measures to avoid conflicts between their own interests and the interests of the company, and shall not use their powers to seek improper gains; (3) Directors, supervisors and senior managers owe a duty of diligence to the company and, in performing their duties, shall exercise the reasonable care ordinarily expected of a manager, acting in the best interests of the company.

2. Persons Subject to the Duties (1) Directors, supervisors and senior managers; (2) A controlling shareholder or de facto controller who does not serve as a director of the company but actually manages the affairs of the company. (Article 180, paragraph 3 of the Company Law)

3. Prohibited Conduct of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers (Article 181 of the Company Law) (1) Misappropriating company property or diverting company funds; (2) Depositing company funds in an account opened in his own name or in the name of another individual; (3) Using his powers to offer bribes or to accept other unlawful income; (4) Accepting commissions from others in connection with transactions with the company and keeping them for himself; (5) Disclosing company secrets without authorisation; (6) Other conduct in breach of the duty of loyalty owed to the company.

(II) Related-Party Transactions

1. Persons Subject to the Duty: Directors, supervisors, senior managers, and related persons having a related-party relationship with them (Article 182 of the Company Law). Specifically: ① directors, supervisors and senior managers; ② close relatives of directors, supervisors and senior managers; ③ enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by directors, supervisors or senior managers or their close relatives; ④ other related persons having other related-party relationships with directors, supervisors or senior managers.

2. Rules on Reporting and Resolutions for Related-Party Transactions (1) Where any of the above persons directly or indirectly enters into a contract with, or conducts a transaction with, the company, he shall report matters relating to the conclusion of the contract or the conduct of the transaction to the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting, and the matter shall be approved by a resolution of the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting in accordance with the articles of association of the company. (2) When the board of directors resolves on any of the above matters, an interested director shall not participate in the vote, and his voting rights shall not be counted in the total number of voting rights; where the number of disinterested directors present at the meeting of the board of directors is fewer than three, the matter shall be submitted to the shareholders' meeting for deliberation.

3. Practical Difficulty: Where a Related-Party Transaction Is Entered Into Directly or Indirectly with the Company Without Going Through the Statutory Reporting or Company Resolution Procedures, What Is the Effect of the Contract? The general approach in practice is: where the company requests confirmation that the transaction is of no effect as against the company, the people's court shall support the request. The parties shall be entitled, in accordance with the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China and the relevant judicial interpretations, to request the return of property or compensation for losses.

4. Remedies (1) Where a related-party transaction entered into by a controlling shareholder, de facto controller, director, supervisor or senior manager causes loss to the company, and the company requests compensation for the loss, the people's court shall support the request in accordance with the law. Where the defendant raises as a defence only that the related-party transaction has already gone through the procedures prescribed by laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association, such as reporting and approval by the shareholders' meeting or the board of directors, the people's court shall not support such a defence. (2) Where a related-party transaction is void, of pending effect, revocable, or of no effect as against the company, and the company has not brought an action, and a qualified shareholder brings a shareholder representative action in accordance with the law, the people's court shall support the action.

(III) Usurping a Business Opportunity Belonging to the Company

1. General Rule Directors, supervisors and senior managers shall not, by taking advantage of their positions, usurp for themselves or for others a business opportunity belonging to the company. (Article 183 of the Company Law)

2. Exceptions A case shall not be treated as usurping a business opportunity belonging to the company where any of the following circumstances applies: (1) The matter has been reported to the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting and approved by a resolution of the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting in accordance with the articles of association of the company; (when the board of directors resolves on any of the above matters, an interested director shall not participate in the vote, and his voting rights shall not be counted in the total number of voting rights; where the number of disinterested directors present at the meeting of the board of directors is fewer than three, the matter shall be submitted to the shareholders' meeting for deliberation) (2) Under laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company, the company is unable to take advantage of the business opportunity.

(IV) Competing Business

1. General Rule Directors, supervisors and senior managers shall not, on their own account or for others, operate a business of the same kind as that of the company in which they serve. (Article 184 of the Company Law)

2. Exceptions (1) The matter has been reported to the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting and approved by a resolution of the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting in accordance with the articles of association of the company. (2) When the board of directors resolves on any of the above matters, an interested director shall not participate in the vote, and his voting rights shall not be counted in the total number of voting rights; where the number of disinterested directors present at the meeting of the board of directors is fewer than three, the matter shall be submitted to the shareholders' meeting for deliberation.

(V) Consequences of Breach of Duty

1. The Company's Right of Disgorgement (Article 186 of the Company Law) Any income obtained by a director, supervisor or senior manager in breach of the above provisions shall belong to the company.

2. Liability to Compensate the Company (Article 188 of the Company Law) (1) Where a director, supervisor or senior manager, in performing his duties, violates laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company and causes loss to the company, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (See below) (2) Where the company refuses to bring an action, or is in a hurry to bring an action, a shareholder representative action may arise. (See below)

II. Liability of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers to Compensate, and the Pursuit of Such Liability

Knowledge Point 064: Circumstances in Which Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers Are Liable to Compensate ★★★

1. Person Liable: Directors (1) After the establishment of a company, the board of directors shall examine the contributions made by the shareholders; where the board of directors fails to perform this duty in a timely manner and causes loss to the company, the directors who bear responsibility shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 51 of the Company Law) (2) Where a liquidation obligor (in principle, the directors) fails to perform the liquidation obligation in a timely manner and causes loss to the company or its creditors, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 232, paragraph 3 of the Company Law) (3) Where a member of the liquidation group neglects to perform his liquidation duties and causes loss to the company, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss; where he causes loss to the creditors by intention or gross negligence, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 238, paragraph 2 of the Company Law) [Note] The company may, during a director's term of office, take out liability insurance in respect of the compensation liability assumed by the director for performing the duties of the company.

2. Persons Liable: Directors and Senior Managers (1) Where directors or senior managers violate laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company and harm the interests of shareholders, the shareholders may bring an action before a court. (Article 190 of the Company Law) (This is a "shareholder direct action" [1]) (2) Where a director or senior manager, in performing his duties, causes damage to another person, the company shall be liable to compensate for the damage; where the director or senior manager acted with intention or gross negligence, he shall also be liable to compensate for the damage. (Article 191 of the Company Law) (3) Where the controlling shareholder or de facto controller of a company instructs a director or senior manager to engage in conduct that harms the interests of the company or its shareholders, he shall bear joint and several liability together with that director or senior manager. (Article 192 of the Company Law)

3. Persons Liable: Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers (1) Where a director, supervisor or senior manager, in performing his duties, violates laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company and causes loss to the company, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 188 of the Company Law) (2) Related-party transactions harming the interests of the company: the controlling shareholder, de facto controller, directors, supervisors and senior managers of a company shall not use a related-party relationship to harm the interests of the company. Where the above provisions are violated and loss is caused to the company, the person shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 22 of the Company Law) (3) Withdrawal of capital contributions: after the establishment of a company, shareholders shall not withdraw their capital contributions. Where a shareholder withdraws his capital contribution and causes loss to the company, the directors, supervisors and senior managers who bear responsibility shall bear joint and several liability to compensate together with that shareholder. (Article 53 of the Company Law) (4) Unlawful reduction of capital: where a shareholder who reduces the registered capital in violation of the Company Law causes loss to the company, the shareholder and the directors, supervisors and senior managers who bear responsibility shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 226 of the Company Law) (5) Unlawful distribution of profits: where a company distributes profits to shareholders in violation of the Company Law and causes loss to the company, the shareholders and the directors, supervisors and senior managers who bear responsibility shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (Article 211 of the Company Law) (6) Others. (Omitted)

[1] In practice, common circumstances of a shareholder direct action include: where, in the course of performing their duties, directors or senior managers violate laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company and directly harm the lawful rights and interests of shareholders, such as the right to claim distribution of profits, the pre-emptive right to subscribe for new shares, the right to claim distribution of residual property, and the right to participate in the operation and management of the company, and the shareholders request the directors or senior managers to bear civil liability such as ceasing the infringement, restoring the original state, or compensating for losses, the court shall support the request in accordance with the law.

III. Pursuit of Liability Where Directors, Supervisors and Senior Managers Harm the Interests of the Company (Shareholder Representative Action)

A shareholder representative action, also known as a derivative action or shareholder subrogation action, refers to an action brought by a shareholder in his own name before a court, for the benefit of the company, where the lawful rights and interests of the company have been unlawfully infringed by an insider and the company is in a hurry to bring an action or refuses to do so.

Knowledge Point 065: Grounds for a Shareholder Representative Action

The grounds for such an action may be summarised as "an insider (a person who can control the company or who can exert significant influence over the company's decision-making) harming the interests of the company". Specifically, they include:

1. Directors, supervisors or senior managers infringing the lawful rights and interests of the company and causing loss to the company (1) Where a director, supervisor or senior manager, in performing his duties, violates laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company and causes loss to the company, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss; (2) Where the company has not brought an action, a qualified shareholder may bring a shareholder representative action. [Example] Xiang is the chairman and legal representative of Xuancao Company. Without authorisation, he sold his private car, worth RMB 100,000, to Xuancao Company for RMB 1,000,000. In this case, the proper plaintiff should have been Xuancao Company, with Xiang (its legal representative) as its litigation representative; but the defendant in this case is precisely Xiang. In general, a person will not "sue himself", so where the lawful rights and interests of the company are infringed by an insider, it is very difficult for the company to claim compensation.

2. Another person infringing the lawful rights and interests of the company and causing loss to the company (1) Where a related-party transaction harms the interests of the company, under Article 22 of the Company Law, the company may request the controlling shareholder or de facto controller to compensate for the loss caused; where the company has not brought an action, a qualified shareholder may bring a shareholder representative action. (2) Where a controlling shareholder or de facto controller "instructs" a director or senior manager to engage in conduct that harms the interests of the company or its shareholders, under Article 192 of the Company Law, he shall bear joint and several liability; where the company has not brought an action against the controlling shareholder or de facto controller, a qualified shareholder may bring a shareholder representative action against him.

Knowledge Point 066: Preconditions for a Shareholder Representative Action ★★★

1. General Rule: A Shareholder Shall First Make a Request to the Relevant Organ of the Company, and May Not Directly Bring a "Shareholder Representative Action" Where a shareholder wishes to bring a shareholder representative action, he shall first make a request to the relevant organ of the company, requesting the company to bring an action before a court. Such a "request" shall comply with the following rules: (1) Where directors or senior managers are in the above circumstances, a qualified shareholder (a shareholder of a limited liability company, or a shareholder of a joint stock limited company who has, for 180 consecutive days or more, held, alone or in aggregate, 1% or more of the shares of the company) may make a written request to the board of supervisors to bring an action before a court; (2) Where a supervisor is in the above circumstances, the above shareholder may make a written request to the board of directors to bring an action before a court; (3) Where a shareholder brings a shareholder representative action directly without making a written request to the board of supervisors or the board of directors to bring an action in accordance with the law, the court shall not accept the action; (4) Where a director, supervisor or senior manager of a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company is in the above circumstances, or another person infringes the lawful rights and interests of the wholly-owned subsidiary of the company and causes loss, a qualified shareholder may, in accordance with the above "cross-request" rules, make a written request to the board of supervisors or the board of directors of the wholly-owned subsidiary to bring an action before a court or bring an action directly before a court in his own name.

[Xuan's Key Point] The "cross-request" may be summarised as: "Where directors or senior managers harm the company → make the request to the board of supervisors; where a supervisor harms the company → make the request to the board of directors".

1. Practical Difficulty: Exceptions in Which a Shareholder Representative Action May Be Brought Directly In practice, it is generally considered that, where the circumstances are urgent, or where there is no possibility of the relevant organ of the company bringing an action, a shareholder need not go through the above "precondition procedure" and may bring a shareholder representative action directly. Specifically, this includes: (1) Where failure to bring an action immediately would cause irreparable harm to the interests of the company; (2) Where the board of supervisors or the board of directors refuses to bring an action or is unable to do so; (3) Where the company has neither a board of supervisors nor an audit committee, and a qualified shareholder brings an action against directors or senior managers in accordance with the law.

2. Practical Difficulty: Rules for a Direct Action Brought by the Company Upon Accepting a Shareholder's Request [Common Pitfall] This is a direct action brought by the company where directors, supervisors or senior managers harm the interests of the company, not a shareholder representative action. (1) Where a director or senior manager, in performing his duties, violates laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company and causes loss to the company or its wholly-owned subsidiary, and the board of supervisors is to represent the company in bringing an action against the director or senior manager in accordance with the law: ① the company shall be listed as the plaintiff, and the chairman of the board of supervisors, or a supervisor where no board of supervisors is established, shall represent the company in the action; ② where the company has no supervisor, a disinterested member of the audit committee exercising the functions of the board of supervisors shall represent the company in the action; ③ where the company has neither a supervisor nor an audit committee exercising the functions of the board of supervisors, the shareholder who made the written request for the company to bring the action, or another shareholder having no interest in relation to the director or senior manager being sued, shall represent the company in the action. (2) Where a supervisor, in performing his duties, violates laws, regulations or the articles of association of the company and causes loss to the company or its wholly-owned subsidiary, and the board of directors is to represent the company in bringing an action against the supervisor in accordance with the law: the company shall be listed as the plaintiff, and the chairman of the board of directors, or a director where no board of directors is established, shall represent the company in the action.

Knowledge Point 067: Procedural Rules for Shareholder Representative Actions ★★★

1. Precondition The relevant organ of the company has not brought an action on behalf of the company in accordance with the above provisions. Specifically: (1) The relevant organ of the company (the board of supervisors, a supervisor where no board of supervisors is established, or the audit committee exercising the functions of the board of supervisors; the board of directors or a director where no board of directors is established) has refused to bring an action after receiving the shareholder's written request; (2) The relevant organ of the company has not brought an action within 30 days of receiving the request.

2. Parties to the Action (1) The plaintiff is the shareholder. The shareholder is entitled, for the benefit of the company, to bring an action directly before a court in his own name.

[Example] In August 2021, Company A Coffee was fined RMB 40,000,000 by the State Administration for Market Regulation for unfair competition through organising sham transactions by directors, senior managers and others, but Company A Coffee did not pursue the persons responsible. In June 2022, Zhang became a shareholder of Company A Coffee by purchasing the shares of a former major shareholder. At that point, Zhang was entitled to bring a shareholder representative action.

(2) The defendant is the infringer. (3) The company or its wholly-owned subsidiary is a third party.

1. Practical Difficulty: Bearing of Litigation Costs and Settlement (1) In a shareholder representative action, where the shareholder succeeds, the company or its wholly-owned subsidiary shall bear the reasonable expenses incurred by the shareholder in participating in the action, such as lawyers' fees; [1] (2) Where, after a shareholder has brought a representative action in accordance with the law, the parties reach a settlement agreement and it is approved by a resolution of the shareholders' meeting or the board of directors of the company, the court shall issue a mediation statement to confirm it.

2. Practical Difficulty: Counterclaims in Shareholder Representative Actions (1) Precondition: another person has infringed the lawful rights and interests of the company or its wholly-owned subsidiary and caused loss to the company, and a shareholder has brought a representative action. (2) Treatment: ① Where that other person brings a counterclaim on the ground that the plaintiff shareholder maliciously sued and infringed his lawful rights and interests, the court shall accept it; ② Where that other person brings a counterclaim against the company on the ground that the company should bear liability for infringement or breach of contract in the dispute in question, the court shall not accept it.

[In-Class Quiz] Da Xiang is the manager of Company A, a limited liability company (hereinafter "Company A"), and, by taking advantage of his position, usurped for his younger brother Xiao Xiang's Company B a business opportunity belonging to Company A, causing Company A a loss of RMB 500,000. Fei Xia, a minority shareholder of Company A, wishes to protect the interests of the company through litigation. Which of the following options regarding Fei Xia's approach are incorrect? [2] A. He must first make a written request to the board of directors of Company A to bring an action against Da Xiang; B. He must first make a written request to the board of supervisors of Company A to bring an action against Da Xiang; C. Only where the board of directors refuses to bring an action may he request the board of supervisors to bring an action against Da Xiang; D. Only where his shareholding reaches 1% may he request the relevant organ of Company A to bring an action against Da Xiang.

Topic 9: Summary of Frequently Tested Points

1. Persons who may not serve as directors, supervisors or senior managers of a company: "Minors, persons of unsound mind, embezzlers, incompetent managers, and dishonest debtors".

2. Determining the lawfulness of a company's appointment and removal of directors, supervisors and senior managers.

3. Distinguishing the prohibited conduct of directors, supervisors and senior managers from conduct subject to restriction; mastering the types of conduct subject to restriction.

4. The liability of directors, supervisors and senior managers to compensate.

5. From the perspective of substantive law: whether a shareholder may bring a shareholder representative action; from the perspective of procedural law: how a shareholder brings a shareholder representative action, with particular attention to its special procedural rules.

[1] In the above "preconditions for a shareholder representative action", we have seen that a shareholder must first make a "request" to the relevant organ of the company, and only where the request is refused or in other such circumstances may the shareholder bring a representative action. This shows that the company does not wish to bring the action. Therefore, if the shareholder loses, the expenses incurred by the shareholder, such as investigation fees, appraisal fees and notarisation fees, shall all be borne by the shareholder himself. [2] ACD

Topic 10: The Company's Finance and Accounting, Merger and Division, Capital Increase and Capital Reduction, Dissolution and Liquidation

The following is the full verbatim text of Topic 10, "The Company's Finance and Accounting, Merger and Division, Capital Increase and Capital Reduction, Dissolution and Liquidation", from the 2026 Commercial and Economic Law — Yan Mengxuan Systematic Intensive Lecture:

Topic 10: The Company's Finance and Accounting, Merger and Division, Capital Increase and Capital Reduction, Dissolution and Liquidation

I. Distribution of the Company's Earnings

Knowledge Point 068: Order of Distribution of Company Earnings (At Company Level: How Profits Are Distributed) ★★★

1. Legal Rules Article 210, paragraph 4 of the Company Law: After a company has made up its losses and drawn the provident fund from its after-tax profits, a limited liability company shall distribute profits in proportion to the capital contributions actually paid by the shareholders, unless all shareholders agree not to distribute profits in proportion to their capital contributions; a joint stock limited company shall distribute profits in proportion to the shares held by the shareholders, unless the articles of association of the company provide otherwise.

It follows from the above provision that, when a company distributes the profits of the current year, it must follow the statutory order. (1) The statutory order of distribution of company profits:

[Principle] Shares in the company acquired by the company in the statutory circumstances must be transferred or cancelled within a certain period. Therefore, before the company transfers or cancels them, even though it holds shares in itself, it is not entitled to distribution of company profits.

[Example] The registered capital of Xuancao Company is RMB 1,000,000, and it was agreed that A, B and C would each pay their contributions in one lump sum in the proportions of 20%, 30% and 50% respectively. A and B have paid in full, but C has paid only RMB 300,000, so C's proportion of capital actually paid is 37.5%. The calculation is as follows: total registered capital actually paid is RMB 800,000, and C actually contributed RMB 300,000, so 300,000 ÷ 800,000 = 37.5%. If the total dividend distributed by Xuancao Company in the current year is RMB 100,000, C is entitled to RMB 37,500.

[Note] The order of distribution of company profits is: make up losses → pay taxes → draw the provident fund → distribute to shareholders.

(2) Consequences of distributing profits in breach of the order ① Where a company distributes profits to shareholders in violation of the Company Law before making up losses and drawing the statutory provident fund, the shareholders shall return to the company the profits distributed in violation of the provisions; ② Where loss is caused to the company, the shareholders and the directors, supervisors and senior managers who bear responsibility shall be liable to compensate for the loss.

1. Practical Difficulty: How a Shareholder Brings an Action Requesting Distribution of Profits (1) Where a shareholder, relying on a resolution of the shareholders' meeting setting out a specific distribution plan, requests the company to distribute profits, and the company refuses to distribute profits without a proper reason, the court shall order the company to distribute profits to the shareholders in accordance with the distribution plan set out in the resolution. (2) Where a shareholder requests the company to distribute profits without submitting a resolution of the shareholders' meeting setting out a specific distribution plan, the court shall not support the request. (3) Where a company distributes profits to some shareholders in violation of the law, and other shareholders bring a shareholder representative action in accordance with the law: ① Where they request that those shareholders return the unlawfully obtained profits to the company and compensate for losses, and that the directors, supervisors and senior managers who bear responsibility bear liability to compensate for the loss caused by the inability to return the profits, the court shall support the request; ② Where they request the company to distribute profits, the court shall not support the request, except where the company satisfies the conditions for distributing profits and a specific distribution plan can be determined in accordance with the articles of association of the company or the company's previous profit distributions. (4) Where a company has been profitable for five consecutive years and satisfies the conditions for distributing profits, but has adopted a resolution of the shareholders' meeting not to distribute profits to shareholders, and a shareholder who voted against the resolution requests the company to acquire his shares at a reasonable price, the court shall support the request. (5) In an action by a shareholder requesting the company to distribute profits, the company shall be listed as the defendant. Before the conclusion of the court debate at first instance, other shareholders who request distribution of profits under the same distribution plan and apply to participate in the action shall be joint plaintiffs.

[Principle] The distribution of a company's surplus is a matter of the company's own decision-making, a commercial judgment made by the company or the shareholders on the basis of their own knowledge and experience. Therefore, when a court intervenes in matters of surplus distribution that fall within the scope of the company's autonomy of will, it should act with caution and shall not compel the company to distribute profits by judgment.

Knowledge Point 069: The Provident Fund

The provident fund, also known as the reserve fund, refers to funds drawn by a company from its profits in accordance with the law in order to strengthen its own asset capacity, expand production and operations, and guard against unexpected losses. The provident fund is divided into the statutory provident fund, the discretionary provident fund and the capital provident fund.

1. Statutory provident fund (1) When a company distributes its after-tax profits for the current year, it shall draw 10% of the profits into the statutory provident fund of the company; (2) Where the accumulated amount of the statutory provident fund reaches 50% or more of the registered capital of the company, no further drawing is required; (3) Where the statutory provident fund is converted into an increase in registered capital, the amount of that provident fund retained shall not be less than 25% of the registered capital of the company before the conversion. [Example] Xuancao Company currently has registered capital of RMB 30,000,000 and a statutory provident fund of RMB 10,000,000. If the maximum amount that may be converted into registered capital is X, the formula is (10,000,000 − X) ≥ 30,000,000 × 25%, from which it follows that X ≤ RMB 2,500,000.

2. Discretionary provident fund After drawing the statutory provident fund from its after-tax profits, a company may, by resolution of the shareholders' meeting, further draw a discretionary provident fund from its after-tax profits.

3. Capital provident fund The items that shall be listed as the capital provident fund of a company are, in essence, the investment received by the enterprise from investors in excess of their share in the registered capital or share capital of the enterprise, as well as gains and losses directly credited to owners' equity and retained earnings.

[In-Class Quiz] The registered capital of Xuancao Company is RMB 1,000,000. Zhang and Luo are shareholders, holding 70% and 30% of the shares respectively. In 2022, Xuancao Company decided to increase its registered capital and bring in Baiguo Company as an investor. Zhang, Luo, Xuancao Company and Baiguo Company separately entered into an investment agreement, agreeing that Baiguo Company would invest RMB 20,000,000 and hold 20% of the shares. Question: Of the RMB 20,000,000 invested by Baiguo Company, how much is credited to the registered capital of Xuancao Company, and how much is credited to the capital provident fund? Answer: Let X be the amount credited to registered capital, then X ÷ (1,000,000 + X) = 20%, from which it follows that X = RMB 250,000. Therefore, of Baiguo Company's investment of RMB 20,000,000, RMB 250,000 is credited to registered capital and the remainder is credited to the capital provident fund.

1. Uses of the Provident Fund (1) The provident fund is used to make up the losses of the company, to expand the company's production and operations, or to be converted into an increase in the registered capital of the company. (2) Where the provident fund is used to make up the losses of the company, the discretionary provident fund and the statutory provident fund shall be used first; where the losses still cannot be made up, the capital provident fund may be used in accordance with the provisions.

II. Merger and Division of Companies ★

Knowledge Point 070: Types of Merger and Division of Companies ★

Knowledge Point 071: Procedures for Merger and Division of Companies ★★

[Common Pitfall] Only in merger procedures do creditors have the right to require the company to pay its debts or to provide corresponding security. This is because in division procedures, the debts are borne by the companies after the division with joint and several liability, which already provides strong protection for creditors.

III. Capital Increase and Capital Reduction of Companies

Knowledge Point 072: Capital Increase of a Company ★★★

[Note] Pay attention to the voting proportion for a capital increase of a company (two-thirds or more of the voting rights) and to a change in the proportion of capital actually paid by shareholders (a "unanimous decision").

[In-Class Quiz] Xuancao Limited Liability Company has six shareholders. The shareholders' meeting resolved that, in this capital increase, an external investor, A, would be brought in, and the capital increase of RMB 5,000,000 would be paid entirely by A. Zhang agreed to the capital increase but objected to bringing in A, while the other five shareholders, lacking funds of their own, all agreed to a targeted capital increase by A. Question: What remedies may Zhang take? May Zhang exercise a pre-emptive right to subscribe in respect of the capital contributions waived by the other shareholders? Answer: Zhang is entitled, in proportion to the capital contributions actually paid by him, to assert a pre-emptive right to subscribe at the time of this capital increase. That is to say, even where an external investor, A, exists, Zhang's pre-emptive right to subscribe must still be protected. However, Zhang has no right to subscribe preferentially for the portion waived by the other shareholders.

Knowledge Point 073: Valuation Adjustment Agreements (Betting Agreements) ★★

1. Concept of a Valuation Adjustment Agreement A valuation adjustment agreement, also known as a betting agreement (对赌协议), refers to an agreement entered into between an investor and a company or its shareholders or de facto controller, providing that, where the company fails to meet the agreed performance targets within a certain period or fails to achieve listing or other conditions, the company or its shareholders or de facto controller shall repurchase the shares or assume an obligation of monetary compensation.

2. Effect of a Valuation Adjustment Agreement (1) Limited liability companies and non-publicly issued joint stock limited companies: Whether an investor enters into a valuation adjustment agreement with the company or with its shareholders or de facto controller, the agreement is valid so long as there is no statutory ground for invalidity. [Example 1] (Betting with the company) Xuancao Joint Stock Limited Company (a non-publicly issued joint stock company) decided to bring in an external investor, Zhang San, and stated in the capital contribution certificate issued to Zhang San: "Zhang San contributes RMB 10,000,000 and holds 5% of the shares. Xuancao Company undertakes that its total profits will reach RMB 40,000,000 within three years; if the target is not met upon expiry, the company shall return the principal and interest at an annual interest rate of 8%." This is a betting agreement entered into with the target company, and the agreement is valid. [Example 2] (Betting with shareholders or the de facto controller) In Example 1, if the parties had instead agreed that "if Xuancao Company fails to achieve listing upon expiry, Li, a major shareholder of the company, shall return the principal and interest at an annual interest rate of 8%", this would be a betting agreement entered into with a shareholder, and the agreement is valid.

(2) Special provisions for listed companies: Where an investor enters into a valuation adjustment agreement with a listed company or its controlling shareholder or de facto controller, providing that, where the listed company fails to meet agreed stock market-value indicators such as the price-earnings ratio or price-to-book ratio within a certain period, the company or its controlling shareholder or de facto controller shall repurchase the shares or assume an obligation of monetary compensation, and a party claims that the agreement is invalid, the court shall support the claim.

1. Performance of a Valuation Adjustment Agreement The matter must be handled according to the circumstances:

Knowledge Point 074: Capital Reduction of a Company ★★★

1. Procedure for Capital Reduction of a Company

[Common Pitfall]

1. There is no requirement for the protection of creditors in a capital increase.

2. A simplified capital reduction does not require notice to creditors, and creditors have no right to require the company to pay its debts or to provide corresponding security.

3. Consequences of an Unlawful Capital Reduction (1) Where the registered capital is reduced in violation of the Company Law, the shareholders shall return the funds they received; where shareholders' capital contributions have been reduced or waived, the original position shall be restored. (2) Where loss is caused to the company, the shareholders and the directors, supervisors and senior managers who bear responsibility shall be liable to compensate for the loss.

4. Practical Difficulty: Treatment of a Failure to Notify Creditors in an Ordinary Capital Reduction Procedure [Question 1] Where a company fails to give notice of the capital reduction to a known creditor at the time of the capital reduction, are the shareholders liable to compensate the creditors of the company? Treatment: As to the protection of the interests of the creditors of the company, a consensus has now basically been reached that, where a company reduces its registered capital in violation of the Company Law, and a company creditor whose rights have been infringed requests the shareholders to bear liability for the debts of the company within the scope of the benefits they obtained from the capital reduction, or requests the directors or senior managers who acted with intention or gross negligence to bear liability to compensate for the damage, the court shall support the request. [Question 2] In a capital reduction procedure, does a defect in the company's notice render the capital reduction void? (Or do shareholders have the right to claim that the resolution of the shareholders' meeting on the capital reduction is void?) The Company Law has avoided the controversy over the effect of a defective capital reduction, providing only for the bearing of liability for a defective capital reduction, without expressly stating whether a "capital reduction" carried out in violation of the statutory procedure is effective. As to whether a defective capital reduction is effective, the question remains controversial, and there are mainly three views:

IV. Dissolution of a Company

Dissolution of a company refers to the juridical act by which an established company is extinguished on the basis of certain lawful grounds.

Knowledge Point 075: Grounds for Dissolution of a Company

Knowledge Point 076: Judicial Dissolution of a Company ★★★

Article 231 of the Company Law: Where the operation and management of a company encounter serious difficulties, continued existence would cause significant loss to the interests of the shareholders, and the difficulties cannot be resolved through other means, a shareholder holding 10% or more of the voting rights of the company may request the people's court to dissolve the company.

1. Determining "Serious Difficulties in the Operation and Management of the Company" (1) "Serious difficulties in the operation and management of the company" is also referred to as a state of "company deadlock". In practice, the existence of any of the following circumstances may be found to constitute a "deadlock": ① The company has been unable to convene a shareholders' meeting for two consecutive years or more; ② When shareholders vote, the proportion prescribed by law or by the articles of association of the company cannot be reached, and no effective resolution of the shareholders' meeting can be adopted for two consecutive years or more; ③ The directors of the company have long been in conflict, and the conflict cannot be resolved through the shareholders' meeting; ④ Other circumstances in which the operation and management of the company encounter serious difficulties. (2) Where a shareholder brings an action for dissolution of the company on any of the following grounds, the court shall not accept the action: ① Rights such as the right to know and the right to claim distribution of profits have been harmed; ② The company has incurred losses, and its assets are insufficient to pay all of its debts; ③ The company has had its enterprise legal person business licence revoked and has not undergone liquidation, etc.

[Principle] In determining "whether the operation and management of the company encounter serious difficulties", a comprehensive analysis should be made of the operating state of the company's organs. Where the shareholders' meeting mechanism has long been dysfunctional, there are serious obstacles to internal management, and a "deadlock" state has been reached, it may be found that the operation and management of the company encounter serious difficulties, even if the company is in a profitable state.

1. Determining the Parties to an Action for Judicial Dissolution (1) Plaintiff: A shareholder holding, alone or in aggregate, 10% or more of the voting rights of all shareholders of the company may bring an action for judicial dissolution. (2) Defendant: In an action for dissolution of a company, the company shall be the defendant. (3) Treatment of "other shareholders" who have not brought an action: ① Where a shareholder brings an action naming other shareholders as defendants as well, the court shall inform the plaintiff to change the other shareholders to the status of third parties; where the plaintiff insists on not making the change, the court shall dismiss the plaintiff's action against the other shareholders. ② Where a plaintiff brings an action for dissolution of a company, he shall inform the other shareholders, or the court shall notify them to participate in the action. Where other shareholders or interested persons apply to participate in the action as joint plaintiffs or third parties, the court shall permit them to do so.

2. Treatment of Judicial Dissolution and Liquidation, and Preservation Measures (1) Where a shareholder, at the same time as bringing an action for dissolution of the company, also applies to the court for liquidation of the company, the court shall examine the action for dissolution of the company in accordance with the law; (2) As to the application for liquidation, the court shall not accept it, but shall inform the shareholder that, after the court has adjudged the dissolution of the company, the liquidation obligor shall organise liquidation on his own or the shareholder shall separately apply to the court for liquidation of the company, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Company Law; (3) Where a shareholder, when bringing an action for dissolution of the company, applies to the court for preservation of property or preservation of evidence, the court may permit the application where the shareholder provides security and the normal operation of the company is not affected.

3. Res Judicata Effect of a Dissolution Judgment (1) A judgment made by a court in an action for dissolution of a company is legally effective as against all shareholders of the company; (2) After a court has adjudged that a claim for dissolution of a company be dismissed, where the shareholder who brought the action or another shareholder brings an action for dissolution of the company again on the same facts and grounds, the court shall not accept it.

4. Principle of Emphasising Mediation in Dissolution Actions A court hearing an action for dissolution of a company shall emphasise mediation. (1) Where the parties agree through consultation that the company shall continue to exist by means of the company acquiring shares, a shareholder or another person taking a transfer of shares, or the company reducing its capital, and this does not violate the mandatory provisions of laws or administrative regulations, the court shall support it. (2) Where the parties cannot reach agreement through consultation on the continued existence of the company, the court shall adjudicate the case in a timely manner. (3) Where the company acquires the plaintiff's shares pursuant to mediation by the court, the company shall transfer or cancel the shares within six months of the date on which the mediation statement takes effect. Before the transfer or cancellation of the shares, the plaintiff shall not rely on the company's acquisition of his shares to resist the creditors of the company.

[Classic Case] Lin and Dai were shareholders of Kailei Company. From 2016, conflicts between the two gradually emerged. In the same year, Lin, through his lawyer, sent letters five times to Kailei Company and Dai, stating that, as Lin's rights and interests as a shareholder had been seriously infringed, Lin, as a shareholder holding one-half of the voting rights at the shareholders' meeting of the company, had, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the articles of association of the company, adopted a resolution to dissolve Kailei Company by vote, and requiring Dai to provide the financial books and other materials of Kailei Company and to liquidate Kailei Company. In the same year, Dai replied three times, stating that the resolution of the shareholders' meeting adopted by Lin had no lawful basis, that Dai did not agree to dissolve the company, and requiring Lin to hand over the financial materials of the company. From 2016 to 2019, Kailei Company did not convene a shareholders' meeting for four consecutive years. In the course of handling the dispute, the Mediation Committee of the Garment City Management Committee organised two mediations between the parties, but both were unsuccessful. In December 2020, Lin brought an action before the court, requesting dissolution of Kailei Company, but Dai objected, because, at the time Lin brought the action, Kailei Company and its subordinate branch were operating well. Question: Can the claim for dissolution of the company brought by shareholder Lin be supported by the court? Answer: Yes. Although the company was in a profitable state, its shareholders' meeting mechanism had long been dysfunctional, the company was in a "deadlock" state and could not be resolved by other means, and it had failed to convene a shareholders' meeting for more than two consecutive years, causing significant harm to the interests of the shareholders. It may be found that the operation and management of the company encounter serious difficulties, and a qualified shareholder may bring an action for dissolution of the company.

V. Liquidation of a Company ★

Liquidation refers to the process whereby, after the dissolution of a company, the liquidation obligor deals with the unfinished business of the company, pays the taxes owed by the company, discharges the debts of the company, and distributes the remaining property to the shareholders. Once this series of tasks has been completed, the liquidation obligor applies for deregistration of the company.

[Xuan's Key Point] [Common Pitfall] The "liquidation" here ≠ bankruptcy liquidation proceedings, which must comply with the rules of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.

Knowledge Point 077: The Liquidation Obligor and the Composition of the Liquidation Group ★★

1. The Liquidation Obligor Article 232, paragraph 1 of the Company Law provides that the directors are the liquidation obligors of the company, and shall form a liquidation group to carry out liquidation within 15 days of the date on which the ground for dissolution arises.

2. Composition of the Liquidation Group (1) The liquidation group shall be composed of directors, except where the articles of association of the company provide otherwise or the shareholders' meeting resolves to select other persons; (2) Where a company is required by law to be liquidated, but no liquidation group is formed within the time limit to carry out liquidation, or, after a liquidation group is formed, no liquidation is carried out, an interested person may apply to the court to designate relevant persons to form a liquidation group to carry out liquidation. (Judicial liquidation)

3. Practical Difficulty: The "Interested Persons" Who May Apply for Judicial Liquidation In practice, it is generally considered that, where any of the following interested persons apply to the court to designate a liquidation group to carry out liquidation, the court shall accept the application: ① creditors; ② shareholders; ③ the department that made the decision to revoke the business licence, order closure or revocation, or the company registration authority. However, where directors, in a hurry to perform their liquidation obligations, apply directly to the court to designate a liquidation group for liquidation without forming a liquidation group to carry out liquidation on their own in accordance with the law, the court shall not accept the application.

4. Practical Difficulty: The "Relevant Persons" Who Compose the Liquidation Group In practice, where a court accepts a company liquidation case, it shall promptly organise a liquidation group to carry out liquidation. The members of the liquidation group may be drawn from the following persons or institutions: (1) directors, shareholders, supervisors and senior managers of the company; (2) law firms, accounting firms, bankruptcy liquidation firms and other social intermediary institutions established in accordance with the law; (3) persons in law firms, accounting firms, bankruptcy liquidation firms and other social intermediary institutions established in accordance with the law who possess the relevant professional knowledge and have obtained the qualifications to practise.

Knowledge Point 078: Liquidation Procedures ★★

1. Litigation Status of a Company in Liquidation (1) After a company commences liquidation and before completion of deregistration, civil actions involving the company shall be conducted in the name of the company, and the person in charge of the liquidation group shall represent the company in the action; (2) Where a liquidation group has not yet been formed, the former legal representative shall represent the company in the action.

2. Notice to Creditors and Declaration of Claims (1) The liquidation group shall notify creditors within 10 days of its formation, and make an announcement within 60 days. (2) Creditors shall declare their claims to the liquidation group within 30 days of receiving the notice, or, where no notice is received, within 45 days of the announcement. (3) During the period for declaring claims, the liquidation group shall not make payment to creditors. (4) Where a creditor fails to declare his claim within the prescribed period but makes a supplementary declaration before the conclusion of the liquidation procedure of the company, the liquidation group shall register it. A claim supplemented by a creditor may be discharged in accordance with the law out of the property of the company not yet distributed.

3. Formulating a Liquidation Plan (1) The liquidation group shall formulate a liquidation plan and submit it to the shareholders' meeting or the court for confirmation; (2) During the liquidation period, the company continues to exist, but shall not engage in business activities unrelated to liquidation.

4. Determining Liquidation Property and Distributing Remaining Property (1) Capital contributions not yet paid by shareholders shall all be treated as liquidation property, notwithstanding any limitation period or period for payment of capital contributions. [Note] The "capital contributions not yet paid by shareholders" here include both capital contributions that have fallen due but have not been paid and subscribed capital contributions whose payment period has not yet expired. (2) Liquidation property shall be distributed in the following order: Payment of liquidation expenses → Payment of employees' wages, social insurance premiums and statutory compensation → Payment of taxes owed → Discharge of the debts of the company → Distribution of the remaining property to shareholders → Application for deregistration of the company. (3) Before the property of the company has been discharged in accordance with the above order, it shall not be distributed to shareholders.

Knowledge Point 079: Duties and Liability to Compensate in Liquidation ★★★

1. Liability of the Liquidation Obligor (Directors) As stated above, the directors are the liquidation obligors of the company. (1) Legal rule: Article 232, paragraph 3 of the Company Law provides: "Where a liquidation obligor fails to perform the liquidation obligation in a timely manner and causes loss to the company or its creditors, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss." The nature of this liability to compensate is tort liability for failure to perform the liquidation obligation resulting in the company's inability to be liquidated. (2) Practical difficulty: How to determine "failure to perform the liquidation obligation in a timely manner" It is generally considered that "failure to perform the liquidation obligation in a timely manner" includes the following circumstances: ① Where a director maliciously disposes of the property of the company, or fails to form a liquidation group within the statutory period to commence liquidation, causing the property of the company to depreciate, be damaged or be lost, and a creditor claims that the director shall bear liability to compensate for the damage to the debts of the company within the scope of the loss caused, the people's court shall support the claim; ② Where a director neglects to perform the liquidation obligation, causing the company to be unable to be liquidated because its principal property, account books, important documents and the like have been lost, and a creditor claims that the director shall bear liability to compensate for the damage to the debts of the company, the people's court shall support the claim, except where the director proves by evidence that the company had no property available for liquidation before the ground for dissolution arose.

2. Liability of Members of the Liquidation Group As stated above, the liquidation group is composed of directors, but the articles of association of the company may provide otherwise or the shareholders' meeting may resolve to select other persons; at the same time, an interested person may apply to the people's court to designate relevant persons to form a liquidation group to carry out liquidation. (1) Legal rule: Article 238 of the Company Law provides: "Members of a liquidation group shall, in performing their liquidation duties, be subject to duties of loyalty and diligence. Where a member of a liquidation group neglects to perform his liquidation duties and causes loss to the company, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss; where he causes loss to creditors by intention or gross negligence, he shall be liable to compensate for the loss." (2) Practical difficulty: How to determine "intention or gross negligence" It is generally considered that "intention or gross negligence" includes the following circumstances: ① Where a liquidation group fails to perform its obligation to give notice or make an announcement, causing a creditor to fail to receive payment because he did not declare his claim in a timely manner, and the creditor requests the members of the liquidation group to bear liability to compensate for the loss thereby caused, the people's court shall support the request in accordance with the law; ② Where a member of the liquidation group maliciously disposes of the property of the company, or obtains deregistration of the company from the company registration authority by means of a false liquidation report without going through the liquidation procedure in accordance with the law, and a creditor requests him to bear liability to compensate for the damage, the people's court shall support the request.

Knowledge Point 080: Deregistration of a Company ★★

Topic 10: Summary of Frequently Tested Points

1. The "three threes" of the provident fund (1) Three categories: statutory, discretionary and capital provident funds; (2) Three uses: making up losses / expanding production / increasing capital; (3) Three proportions: 10% / 50% / ≥25% (referring only to the statutory provident fund).

2. Determining the lawfulness of drawing the provident fund; the uses of the capital provident fund: under certain conditions it may be used to make up the losses of the company.

3. The simplified merger procedure.

4. The "pre-emptive right to subscribe" in a capital increase; the distinction between a betting agreement with shareholders and a betting agreement with the company.

5. The simplified capital reduction procedure.

6. The treatment of an unlawful capital reduction.

7. The duties of loyalty and diligence of members of the liquidation group.

8. The treatment of delay in liquidation: compulsory deregistration.

9. Determining the validity of a court-ordered compulsory distribution of company profits.

10. Determining and handling a company "deadlock". This may be subdivided into the following two aspects: (1) From the perspective of substantive law — whether a shareholder may bring an action for judicial dissolution; (2) From the perspective of procedural law — the procedural rules for an action for judicial dissolution.

11. The duties and liability to compensate of the liquidator; determining whether a member of the liquidation group is liable to compensate the company and its creditors.